Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)75-103
Journal / PublicationGames and Economic Behavior
Volume134
Online published14 Apr 2022
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022

Abstract

This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment only causes a second-order qualitative increase in cooperation. At the individual level, reputational uncertainty induces more leniency and forgiveness in imposing network punishment through the link proposal and removal processes, inhibiting the formation of cooperative clusters. However, this effect is significant only in the fast-changing environment and not in the slow-changing environment. A substitution pattern between network punishment and action punishment (retaliatory defection) explains this discrepancy across the two social environments.

Research Area(s)

  • Cooperation, Experiments, Prisoner's dilemma, Uncertainty, Repeated games, Networks

Citation Format(s)

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks. / Gallo, Edoardo; Riyanto, Yohanes E.; Roy, Nilanjan; Teh, Tat-How.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 134, 07.2022, p. 75-103.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review