Contextual deliberation and the choice-valuation preference reversal

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Original languageEnglish
Article number105285
Journal / PublicationJournal of Economic Theory
Online published27 May 2021
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2021
Externally publishedYes



Revealed preferences between lotteries can be asymmetrically reversed across choice and valuation. The ongoing debate is whether the procedure-invariance principle is violated. This research presents a parsimonious theory to reconcile asymmetric preference reversals with procedure invariance. When risk attitude is ex ante imperfectly known, preference-eliciting procedures can endogenously influence revealed preferences through affecting the incentive for information retrieval/acquisition (i.e., deliberation). As predicted, when lottery pairing was known, experiment participants exhibited substantially less asymmetric reversals by stating mean-preserving and more dispersed valuations. Therefore, the endogeneity of asymmetric preference reversals can be substantiated. © 2021 The Author(s)

Research Area(s)

  • Choice, Deliberation, Preference reversal, Procedure invariance, Valuation

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