Confucian Virtue Ethics and Human Dignity: A Xunzian Defense of Constitutional Democracy

In recent years, Confucian philosophers have vigorously explored the ideal of human dignity by reinterpreting key classical Confucian texts, giving rise to two contending accounts of human dignity—egalitarian dignity versus meritocratic dignity. The champions of meritocratic dignity understand human dignity as an achievement, as the outcome of a long process of moral self-cultivation while the supporters of egalitarian dignity, inspired by Mencius who believes that human nature is good, disagree with the strong virtue-ethical account of human dignity and shifts attention to universal moral potentiality. After showing that each Confucian account of human dignity underpins a distinctive political system—Confucian constitutional democracy and Confucian political meritocracy—respectively, this chapter attempts to reinforce the egalitarian account of Confucian dignity from the standpoint of Xunzian Confucianism predicated on the assumption that human nature is bad. The chapter argues that whereas Confucian meritocratc dignity is critically limited in justifying the independent judiciary as well as protecting citizens’ constitutional rights equally, Confucian egalitarian dignity can coherently undergird the principle of the separation of power and the right to political participation.