Condorcet winners for public goods

Lihua Chen; Xiaotie Deng; Qizhi Fang; Feng Tian

doi:10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3

Condorcet winners for public goods

Lihua Chen
, Xiaotie Deng
, Qizhi Fang
, Feng Tian

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the computing problem and the decision problem in the general case, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is considered part of the input size, are all NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models. © 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	229-242
Journal	Annals of Operations Research
Volume	137
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3
Publication status	Published - Jul 2005

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Funding

The results reported in this work are supported by a RGC CERG grant (CityU 1081/02E) and a SRG grant (7001514) of City University of Hong Kong.

Research Keywords

Algorithm
Complexity
Condorcet winner
Majority equilibrium
Public goods

RGC Funding Information

RGC-funded

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10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3

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Cite this

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AU - Fang, Qizhi

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AB - In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the computing problem and the decision problem in the general case, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is considered part of the input size, are all NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models. © 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.

KW - Algorithm

KW - Complexity

KW - Condorcet winner

KW - Majority equilibrium

KW - Public goods

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Condorcet winners for public goods

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Research Keywords

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