TY - GEN
T1 - Composite FDIA and topology attack on the electricity market
AU - Liang, Gaoqi
AU - Weller, Steven R.
AU - Zhao, Junhua
AU - Luo, Fengji
AU - Dong, Zhao Yang
N1 - Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].
PY - 2018/1/29
Y1 - 2018/1/29
N2 - Cyber-attacks pose significant hazards to the secure and economic operation of modern power systems. This paper proposes a composite false data injection attack (FDIA) and cyber topology attack capable of disturbing conventional transactions in the electricity market. The Australian electricity market mechanism is considered, wherein each trading period is comprised of six 5-minute security-constraint economic dispatch (SCED) intervals. In the proposed attack, the manipulation of cyber-topology information over the 30-minute horizon is considered, with the attack objective being the malicious increase in the costs borne by customers in the market. The proposed attack poses no security threat to the power system, affecting only the economic costs to customers. A defining feature of the proposed algorithm is the joint consideration of both topology error processing and bad data detection constraints in order to ensure validity of the proposed attack. The differential evolution (DE) algorithm is used to find the corresponding attack strategies. Case studies are conducted to validate the proposed attack methodology. © 2017 IEEE.
AB - Cyber-attacks pose significant hazards to the secure and economic operation of modern power systems. This paper proposes a composite false data injection attack (FDIA) and cyber topology attack capable of disturbing conventional transactions in the electricity market. The Australian electricity market mechanism is considered, wherein each trading period is comprised of six 5-minute security-constraint economic dispatch (SCED) intervals. In the proposed attack, the manipulation of cyber-topology information over the 30-minute horizon is considered, with the attack objective being the malicious increase in the costs borne by customers in the market. The proposed attack poses no security threat to the power system, affecting only the economic costs to customers. A defining feature of the proposed algorithm is the joint consideration of both topology error processing and bad data detection constraints in order to ensure validity of the proposed attack. The differential evolution (DE) algorithm is used to find the corresponding attack strategies. Case studies are conducted to validate the proposed attack methodology. © 2017 IEEE.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85046358386
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85046358386&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274445
DO - 10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274445
M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)
SN - 9781538622124
VL - 2018-January
T3 - IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
SP - 1
EP - 5
BT - 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017
Y2 - 16 July 2017 through 20 July 2017
ER -