Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidy

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

26 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)417-432
Journal / PublicationJournal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering
Volume26
Issue number4
Online published22 Apr 2017
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2017

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a single-period model comprised of an original manufacturer (OM) who produces only new products and a remanufacturer who collects used products from consumers and produces remanufactured products. The OM and the remanufacturer compete in the product market. We examine the effects of government subsidy as a means to promote remanufacturing activity. In particularly, we consider three subsidy options: subsidy to remanufacturer, subsidy to consumers, and subsidy shared by remanufacturer and consumers. We find that the introduction of government subsidy on remanufacturer or consumers always increases remanufacturing activity. We also find that subsidy to remanufacturer is the best subsidy option, because subsidy to remanufacturer results in lower price of remanufactured products, thus leading to higher consumer surplus.

Research Area(s)

  • competitive strategy, game theory, government subsidy, Remanufacturing