Collective decision through an informed mediator
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 105817 |
| Journal / Publication | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 218 |
| Online published | 9 Mar 2024 |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2024 |
Link(s)
Abstract
An imperfectly informed mediator (or mechanism designer) must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to the decision. The mediator chooses a mechanism before observing a signal about the agents' valuations and commits to truthfully using this information in the mechanism. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on the mediator's information under which the ex post efficient decision rule can be implemented by an ex ante budget balanced, dominant strategy incentive-compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism. In a large economy, we show that the amount of information that the mediator needs to know about each agent to achieve ex post efficiency is bounded as the number of agents grows to infinity.
© 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Research Area(s)
- Asymmetric information, Collective decision, Cross-subsidization mechanism, Provision of public goods
Bibliographic Note
Research Unit(s) information for this publication is provided by the author(s) concerned.
Citation Format(s)
Collective decision through an informed mediator. / Li, Yunan; Zhang, Xingtan.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 218, 105817, 06.2024.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 218, 105817, 06.2024.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
