Clients' strategic change and auditor behavior: Evidence from audit adjustments and audit fees

Using data on audit adjustments, this study examines the relation between Chinese listed companies' strategic change and their auditor's behavior. We find that levels of audit clients' strategic change are positively associated with the magnitude of audit adjustments and audit fees, suggesting that auditors exert greater effort, and propose larger audit adjustments, on these audits. We argue that during a client’ strategic change, auditors rely less on prior experience with the client, and increase their perceived risk of the audit. Further results show a positive correlation between clients' strategic change and the experience level of auditors assigned to the client by the audit firm. We also find evidence that levels of strategic change are negatively associated with pre-audit financial reporting quality, indicating that auditors' perceived risk for clients undergoing strategic change is consistent with clients' real financial reporting risk. Evidence on regulatory sanctions suggests that audit adjustments mitigate the positive association between clients' strategic change and the likelihood of those clients' being sanctioned. Taken together, these results suggest that auditors incorporate clients' strategic change into their assessment of client risk and implement appropriate responses to that risk, and that audit adjustments help companies avoid regulatory sanction. © 2023 Published by Elsevier Ltd.