Choices in the 11–20 Game : The Role of Risk Aversion

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Article number53
Journal / PublicationGames
Volume9
Issue number3
Online published24 Jul 2018
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2018

Link(s)

Abstract

Arad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically.

Research Area(s)

  • Experiment, Measuring depth of thinking, Rationality, Risk aversion

Citation Format(s)

Choices in the 11–20 Game : The Role of Risk Aversion. / LI, King King; Rong, Kang.

In: Games, Vol. 9, No. 3, 53, 09.2018.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal

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