CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

Ahmed Elnahas; Lei Gao; Md Noman Hossain; Jeong-Bon Kim

doi:10.1017/S0022109023001023

CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

Ahmed Elnahas, Lei Gao^*, Md Noman Hossain, Jeong-Bon Kim

^*Corresponding author for this work

College of Business

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

10 Downloads (CityUHK Scholars)

Abstract

This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk. © 2023 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	3671-3707
Number of pages	37
Journal	Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume	59
Issue number	8
Online published	12 Sept 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109023001023
Publication status	Published - Dec 2024

Research Keywords

CEO Political Ideology
Conservatism
Information disclosure
Management Earnings Forecasts
Republican versus Democrat

Publisher's Copyright Statement

This full text is made available under CC-BY 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Access Output

10.1017/S0022109023001023

255549436.pdfFinal Published version, 356 KBLicence: CC BY

Other Access Options

Check CityUHK Library

Permanent Link

Right click to copy link

Cite this

@article{cfaf56c1373441329ebacb17ca82882a,

title = "CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure",

abstract = "This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk. {\textcopyright} 2023 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "CEO Political Ideology, Conservatism, Information disclosure, Management Earnings Forecasts, Republican versus Democrat",

author = "Ahmed Elnahas and Lei Gao and Hossain, {Md Noman} and Jeong-Bon Kim",

year = "2024",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1017/S0022109023001023",

language = "English",

volume = "59",

pages = "3671--3707",

journal = "Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis",

issn = "0022-1090",

publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

number = "8",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

AU - Elnahas, Ahmed

AU - Gao, Lei

AU - Hossain, Md Noman

AU - Kim, Jeong-Bon

PY - 2024/12

Y1 - 2024/12

N2 - This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk. © 2023 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.

AB - This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk. © 2023 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.

KW - CEO Political Ideology

KW - Conservatism

KW - Information disclosure

KW - Management Earnings Forecasts

KW - Republican versus Democrat

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85171838671&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85171838671&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.1017/S0022109023001023

DO - 10.1017/S0022109023001023

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0022-1090

VL - 59

SP - 3671

EP - 3707

JO - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

JF - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

IS - 8

ER -

CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure

Abstract

Research Keywords

Publisher's Copyright Statement

Access Output

Other Access Options

Permanent Link

Other Files and Links

Fingerprint

Cite this