CEO dominance, family control and modified audit opinions in Hong Kong

Pek Yee Low; Abdul Majid

doi:10.22495/cocv5i2c1p3

CEO dominance, family control and modified audit opinions in Hong Kong

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

Overview

2 Scopus Citations

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Author(s)

Pek Yee Low
Abdul Majid

Related Research Unit(s)

Department of Accountancy

Detail(s)

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	179-186
Journal / Publication	Corporate Ownership and Control
Volume	5
Issue number	2 B CONT. 1
Publication status	Published - 2008

Link(s)

DOI	DOI https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i2c1p3 Final Published version
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Attachment(s)	Documents 5592771.pdf Final Published version, 256 KB, PDF Publisher's Copyright Statement This is an open access journal which means that all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.
Link to Scopus	https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84896273494&origin=recordpage
Permanent Link	https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/publications/publication(cbb07653-b9c2-43de-a47a-a1ae3fc32586).html

Abstract

This study using Hong Kong data examines the linkages between CEO dominance (CEO and Chairman is the same individual), family ownership and control, and the likelihood that firms receive modified audit opinions. Logistic regression results using a matched pair design of 89 firm-years with modified audit opinions for 1997 to 1999 and 89 firm-years with unqualified audit opinions (control sample), show that family controlled firms are less likely to receive modified audit opinions than non-family controlled firms, and the positive association between CEO dominance and modified audit opinions is evident only for non-family controlled firms. This suggests that the abuse of power arising from CEO dominance may be mitigated by the presence of family ownership and control.