Can financial innovation succeed by catering to behavioral preferences? Evidence from a callable options market

Xindan Li, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Xuewei Yang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the notion that financial products which cater to investors’ behavioral biases can yield high trading activity and thus be profitable for issuers. Our setting considers options with a callback feature, namely, callable bull/bear contracts (CBBCs). Such contracts have high skewness when close to callback and thus appeal to cumulative prospect theory preferences. CBBCs with high skewness earn negative average returns, and issuers’ gross profits vary positively with CBBC skewness. Over the 2009–2014 period, issuers earn gross profits of about $1.67 billion by trading CBBCs on the Hang Seng Index. These findings highlight the role of behavioral finance in financial innovation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)38-65
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume128
Issue number1
Online published9 Feb 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018
Externally publishedYes

Research Keywords

  • Lotteries
  • Gambling
  • Financial innovation
  • Cumulative prospect theory
  • Callable bull/bear contract (CBBC)

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