Budget-feasible procurement mechanisms in two-sided markets

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)Not applicablepeer-review

View graph of relations

Author(s)

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI -18)
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages548-554
ISBN (Print)9780999241127
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2018-July
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Title27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
PlaceSweden
CityStockholm
Period13 - 19 July 2018

Abstract

This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost. Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones. The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded. Our main contribution is a random mechanism that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility, the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers.

Citation Format(s)

Budget-feasible procurement mechanisms in two-sided markets. / Wu, Weiwei; Liu, Xiang; Li, Minming.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI -18). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2018. p. 548-554 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2018-July).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)Not applicablepeer-review