TY - GEN
T1 - Budget-feasible procurement mechanisms in two-sided markets
AU - Wu, Weiwei
AU - Liu, Xiang
AU - Li, Minming
PY - 2018/7
Y1 - 2018/7
N2 - This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost. Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones. The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded. Our main contribution is a random mechanism that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility, the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers.
AB - This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers. Each seller holds an item with public value and is allowed to bid its private cost. Buyers could claim their budgets, not necessarily the true ones. The goal is to seek budget-feasible mechanisms that ensure sellers are rewarded enough payment and buyers' budgets are not exceeded. Our main contribution is a random mechanism that guarantees various desired theoretical guarantees like the budget feasibility, the truthfulness on the sellers' side and the buyers' side simultaneously, and constant approximation to the optimal total procured value of buyers.
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UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85055709965&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.24963/ijcai.2018/76
DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2018/76
M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)
SN - 9780999241127
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 548
EP - 554
BT - Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI -18)
PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
Y2 - 13 July 2018 through 19 July 2018
ER -