Boards, takeover protection, and real earnings management
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 651 - 682 |
| Journal / Publication | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2014 |
Link(s)
Abstract
Corporate accounting scandals during the early 2000s made stringent corporate governance and disclosure measures necessary. Regulatory emphasis shifted toward ensuring reliability of accounting numbers, which reduced the potential for accounting manipulation. Managers who are subject to significant performance pressure from shareholders and analysts now potentially have to resort to real earnings management.
Citation Format(s)
Boards, takeover protection, and real earnings management. / Ge, Wenxia; KIM, Jeong-Bon.
In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 43, No. 4, 01.11.2014, p. 651 - 682.
In: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 43, No. 4, 01.11.2014, p. 651 - 682.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
