Board control and ceo compensation
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › Not applicable › peer-review
|Journal / Publication||Strategic Management Journal|
|Publication status||Published - Jun 1994|
|Link to Scopus||https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84989082201&origin=recordpage|
The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross‐section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability. Copyright © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- agency theory, Boards of directors, executive compensation, strategy implementation