Bertrand competition with intermediation

Xiaoying Liang; Lei Xie; Houmin Yan

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019

Bertrand competition with intermediation

Xiaoying Liang
, Lei Xie
, Houmin Yan

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm's low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	112-114
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	116
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019
Publication status	Published - Jul 2012

Research Keywords

Bertrand competition
Intermediation
Pure strategy

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019

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title = "Bertrand competition with intermediation",

abstract = "We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm's low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. {\textcopyright} 2012 Elsevier B.V.",

keywords = "Bertrand competition, Intermediation, Pure strategy",

author = "Xiaoying Liang and Lei Xie and Houmin Yan",

year = "2012",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019",

language = "English",

volume = "116",

pages = "112--114",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Bertrand competition with intermediation

AU - Liang, Xiaoying

AU - Xie, Lei

AU - Yan, Houmin

PY - 2012/7

Y1 - 2012/7

N2 - We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm's low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

AB - We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm's low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Bertrand competition

KW - Intermediation

KW - Pure strategy

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84857211542

UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84857211542&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 116

SP - 112

EP - 114

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

Bertrand competition with intermediation

Abstract

Research Keywords

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