Bertrand competition with intermediation

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)112-114
Journal / PublicationEconomics Letters
Volume116
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2012

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DOI

DOI
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Link to Scopus https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84857211542&origin=recordpage
Permanent Link https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/publications/publication(ca05fbe8-33c1-42d7-92f0-5a0e4d4526ac).html

Abstract

We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm's low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Research Area(s)

  • Bertrand competition, Intermediation, Pure strategy

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Bertrand competition with intermediation. / Liang, Xiaoying; Xie, Lei; Yan, Houmin.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 116, No. 1, 07.2012, p. 112-114.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review