Auctioning divisible goods

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal

111 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)673-705
Journal / PublicationEconomic Theory
Volume19
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2002
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction.

Research Area(s)

  • Divisible good auctions, Equilibrium bidding, Treasury auctions

Citation Format(s)

Auctioning divisible goods. / Wang, James J.D.; Zender, Jaime F.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 19, No. 4, 06.2002, p. 673-705.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal