Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Related Research Unit(s)
|Journal / Publication||IEEE Communications Letters|
|Publication status||Published - 2009|
|Link to Scopus||https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-61449250638&origin=recordpage|
We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective. © 2009 IEEE.
- Game theory, Mechanism design, Nash equilibrium