Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 154-156 |
| Journal / Publication | IEEE Communications Letters |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |
Link(s)
Abstract
We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategyproofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective. © 2009 IEEE.
Research Area(s)
- Game theory, Mechanism design, Nash equilibrium
Citation Format(s)
Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing. / Su, Xueyuan; Chan, Sammy; Peng, Gang.
In: IEEE Communications Letters, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2009, p. 154-156.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
