An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

Yin Chen; Chuangyin Dang

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023

An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

Yin Chen, Chuangyin Dang^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	659-670
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	124
Online published	8 Feb 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023
Publication status	Published - Nov 2020

Research Keywords

Nash equilibrium
Noncooperative game
Perfect equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium
Smooth path

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023

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title = "An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium",

abstract = "As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path.",

keywords = "Nash equilibrium, Noncooperative game, Perfect equilibrium, Quantal response equilibrium, Smooth path",

author = "Yin Chen and Chuangyin Dang",

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language = "English",

volume = "124",

pages = "659--670",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

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T1 - An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

AU - Chen, Yin

AU - Dang, Chuangyin

PY - 2020/11

Y1 - 2020/11

N2 - As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path.

AB - As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show that the extended QRE is comparable with the logit QRE and further confirm the effectiveness of the path.

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Noncooperative game

KW - Perfect equilibrium

KW - Quantal response equilibrium

KW - Smooth path

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85042202569&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85042202569&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 124

SP - 659

EP - 670

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

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Research Keywords

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GRF: An Interior-point Path-following Approach to the Determination of Perfect Equilibrium for a Finite n-Person Game in Normal Form

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An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium

Abstract

Research Keywords

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GRF: An Interior-point Path-following Approach to the Determination of Perfect Equilibrium for a Finite n-Person Game in Normal Form

Cite this