Abstract
The rapid penetration of mobile devices has provided ample opportunities for mobile devices to exchange sensing data on a peer basis without any centralized backend. In this paper, we design a peer based data exchanging model, where relay nodes move to certain locations to connect data providers and consumers to facilitate data delivery. Both relays and data providers can gain rewards from consumers who are willing to pay for the data. We first prove the problem of relay node assignment is NP-hard, and provide a centralized optimal method to decide which relay nodes goes to which location with an approximation ratio. Then we define an autonomous compensation game to allow relays make individual decisions without any central authority. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium. We analyze and compare this distributed game to the centralized social optimal solution, and show that the game incurs small bounded social costs, and efficient under various network sizes, numbers of providers, consumers, and device mobility. © 2017 IEEE.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQoS 2017 |
| Publisher | IEEE |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781509019830 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 5 Jul 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 25th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQoS 2017 - Vilanova i la Geltru, Spain Duration: 14 Jun 2017 → 16 Jun 2017 |
Publication series
| Name | 2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQoS 2017 |
|---|
Conference
| Conference | 25th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Quality of Service, IWQoS 2017 |
|---|---|
| Place | Spain |
| City | Vilanova i la Geltru |
| Period | 14/06/17 → 16/06/17 |
Bibliographical note
Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].Funding
978-1-5386-2704-4/17/$31.00 ©c 2017 IEEE This work is supported in part by US NSF CSR-1513719, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 11426026, 61632017, 61173011) and a Project 985 grant of Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'An autonomous compensation game to facilitate peer data exchange in crowdsensing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver