TY - JOUR
T1 - AgrAmplifier
T2 - Defending Federated Learning Against Poisoning Attacks Through Local Update Amplification
AU - Gong, Zirui
AU - Shen, Liyue
AU - Zhang, Yanjun
AU - Zhang, Leo Yu
AU - Wang, Jingwei
AU - Bai, Guangdong
AU - Xiang, Yong
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - The collaborative nature of federated learning (FL) poses a major threat in the form of manipulation of local training data and local updates, known as the Byzantine poisoning attack. To address this issue, many Byzantine-robust aggregation rules (AGRs) have been proposed to filter out or moderate suspicious local updates uploaded by Byzantine participants. This paper introduces a novel approach called AGRAMPLIFIER, aiming to simultaneously improve robustness, fidelity, and efficiency of the existing AGRs. The core idea of AGRAMPLIFIER is to amplify the 'morality' of local updates by identifying the most repressive features of each gradient update, which provides a clearer distinction between malicious and benign updates, consequently improving the detection effect. To achieve this objective, two approaches, namely AGRMP and AGRXAI, are proposed. AGRMP organizes local updates into patches and extracts the largest value from each patch, while AGRXAI leverages explainable AI methods to extract the gradient of the most activated features. By equipping AGRAMPLIFIER with the existing Byzantine-robust mechanisms, we successfully enhance the model robustness, maintaining its fidelity and improving overall efficiency. AGRAMPLIFIER is universally compatible with the existing Byzantine-robust mechanisms. The paper demonstrates its effectiveness by integrating it with all mainstream AGR mechanisms. Extensive evaluations conducted on seven datasets from diverse domains against seven representative poisoning attacks consistently show enhancements in robustness, fidelity, and efficiency, with average gains of 40.08%, 39.18%, and 10.68%, respectively. © 2023 IEEE.
AB - The collaborative nature of federated learning (FL) poses a major threat in the form of manipulation of local training data and local updates, known as the Byzantine poisoning attack. To address this issue, many Byzantine-robust aggregation rules (AGRs) have been proposed to filter out or moderate suspicious local updates uploaded by Byzantine participants. This paper introduces a novel approach called AGRAMPLIFIER, aiming to simultaneously improve robustness, fidelity, and efficiency of the existing AGRs. The core idea of AGRAMPLIFIER is to amplify the 'morality' of local updates by identifying the most repressive features of each gradient update, which provides a clearer distinction between malicious and benign updates, consequently improving the detection effect. To achieve this objective, two approaches, namely AGRMP and AGRXAI, are proposed. AGRMP organizes local updates into patches and extracts the largest value from each patch, while AGRXAI leverages explainable AI methods to extract the gradient of the most activated features. By equipping AGRAMPLIFIER with the existing Byzantine-robust mechanisms, we successfully enhance the model robustness, maintaining its fidelity and improving overall efficiency. AGRAMPLIFIER is universally compatible with the existing Byzantine-robust mechanisms. The paper demonstrates its effectiveness by integrating it with all mainstream AGR mechanisms. Extensive evaluations conducted on seven datasets from diverse domains against seven representative poisoning attacks consistently show enhancements in robustness, fidelity, and efficiency, with average gains of 40.08%, 39.18%, and 10.68%, respectively. © 2023 IEEE.
KW - Byzantine-robust aggregation
KW - explainable AI
KW - Federated learning
KW - poisoning attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85178075929&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85178075929&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2023.3333555
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2023.3333555
M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 19
SP - 1241
EP - 1250
JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
ER -