Advisor Lending to the Advised Acquirer During M&A : Conflict of Interest or Last Resort Financing?
Research output: Conference Papers (RGC: 31A, 31B, 32, 33) › 32_Refereed conference paper (without host publication) › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 63 |
Publication status | Published - 15 Dec 2016 |
Conference
Title | 29th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference |
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Location | Shangri-La Hotel Sydney |
Place | Australia |
City | Sydney |
Period | 14 - 16 December 2016 |
Link(s)
Document Link | Links |
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Permanent Link | https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/publications/publication(667e3d5c-11a5-435f-bd18-e56cd0e86438).html |
Abstract
Previous research has shown that acquirers’ M&A announcement effects, on average, become significantly positive if loan financing is involved. We find that when advisors lend to their advised acquirers during M&A deals, the syndicated loan spreads are unusually high, and the advisor-lender dual role significantly reduces the acquirers’ announcement effect. This appears to reflect conflicts of interest, undermining the information production/certification role of loan financing. However, evidence that high need for external finance justifies the expensive advisor lending supports a last-resort-financing explanation instead — investment banks act as a last resort through the advisor-lender dual role in M&A.
Bibliographic Note
Information for this record is supplemented by the author(s) concerned.
Citation Format(s)
Advisor Lending to the Advised Acquirer During M&A: Conflict of Interest or Last Resort Financing? / CHEN, Chong; WU, Xueping.
2016. Paper presented at 29th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
2016. Paper presented at 29th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
Research output: Conference Papers (RGC: 31A, 31B, 32, 33) › 32_Refereed conference paper (without host publication) › peer-review