A secure incentive protocol for mobile ad hoc networks

Yanchao Zhang, Wenjing Lou, Wei Liu, Yuguang Fang

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

79 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP. © 2006 Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)569-582
JournalWireless Networks
Volume13
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2007
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Research Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Incentive
  • Mobile ad hoc networks
  • Security
  • Selfishness

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