A political-economic analysis of auditor reporting and auditor switches

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalNot applicablepeer-review

102 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-48
Journal / PublicationReview of Accounting Studies
Volume11
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2006
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

This study examines whether auditor opinions are affected by political and economic influences from governments. We use auditor locality (local versus non-local) to capture such influences from local governments in China. Based on data from China's stock markets for the period 1996-2002, we find that local auditors, who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to report favorably on local government-owned companies to mitigate probable economic losses. Moreover, companies with qualified opinions are more likely to switch from a non-local auditor to a local auditor than companies with unqualified opinions. Contrary to some prior studies, we find that in China's political environment, local government-owned companies that switched from a non-local auditor to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion can succeed in opinion shopping. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.

Research Area(s)

  • Audit qualifications, Auditor locality, Auditor switches, Economic dependence, Political influence