A game-theoretic analysis of demand response in electricity markets

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 IEEE PES General Meeting
PublisherIEEE
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4799-6415-4
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2014
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
ISSN (Print)1944-9925

Conference

Title2014 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
PlaceUnited States
CityNational Harbor
Period27 - 31 July 2014

Abstract

This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to demand response in electricity markets. A Stackelberg game model is developed to capture the interplay between a Demand Response Aggregator (DRA) and electricity generators, where the DRA acts the leader of the game and makes demand reduction bids by taking into account their profitability. The classical generators respond by adjusting their electricity generation levels which leads to an equilibrium solution of the resulting strategic (non-cooperative) game in the competitive wholesale electricity market. A numerical analysis of the Stackelberg game shows that highly concentrated markets during the peak hours are the most profitable scenarios for the demand response from the DRA's perspective.

Research Area(s)

  • Demand Response, Electricity market, Game theory

Citation Format(s)

A game-theoretic analysis of demand response in electricity markets. / Nekouei, Ehsan; Alpcan, Tansu; Chattopadhyay, Deb.

2014 IEEE PES General Meeting. IEEE, 2014. (IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review