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Abstract
The concept of proper equilibrium was established as a strict refinement of perfect equilibrium. This establishment has significantly advanced the development of game theory and its applications. Nonetheless, it remains a challenging problem to compute such an equilibrium. This paper develops a differentiable path-following method with a compact formulation to compute a proper equilibrium. The method incorporates square root-barrier terms into payoff functions with an extra variable and constitutes a square root-barrier game. As a result of this barrier game, we acquire a smooth path to a proper equilibrium. To further reduce the computational burden, we present a compact formulation of an epsilon-proper equilibrium with a polynomial number of variables and equations. Numerical results show that the differentiable path-following method is numerically stable and efficient. Moreover, by relaxing the requirements of proper equilibrium and imposing Selten's perfection, we come up with the notion of perfect d-proper equilibrium, which approximates a proper equilibrium and is less costly to compute. Numerical examples demonstrate that even when d is rather large, a perfect d-proper equilibrium remains to be a proper equilibrium. © 2023 INFORMS
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | INFORMS Journal on Computing |
| Online published | 11 Oct 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Online published - 11 Oct 2023 |
Funding
This work was partially supported by GeneralResearch Fund (GRF) CityU 11306821 of Hong Kong SAR Government.
Research Keywords
- noncooperative game
- Nash equilibrium
- proper equilibrium
- perfect d-proper equilibrium
- differentiable path-following method
RGC Funding Information
- RGC-funded
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GRF: Differentiable Path-Following Methods with Compact Formulations to Compute Extended and Perfect d-Extended Proper Equilibria in Robust Games
DANG, C. (Principal Investigator / Project Coordinator)
1/01/22 → …
Project: Research