经销商 “抱团” 如何改变渠道中的合同治理

How Does Distributors’ “Banding Together” Affect Contractual Governance in Marketing Channels

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal

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Author(s)

  • 丰超
  • 庄贵军
  • 陈慧
  • 卢亭宇

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Article number1
Pages (from-to)4-13, 22
Number of pages10
Journal / Publication南开管理评论
Volume22
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 8 Apr 2019

Abstract

文章以社会网络理论和营销渠道治理的相关研究为理论基础,探讨经销商 "抱团" (网络密度)对渠道中的合同治理强度以及渠道冲突的影响,并检验经销商网络中心性的调节作用。文章以制造商与经销商的合作关系为研究情境,从制造商角度收集 288 份有效数据,应用统计方法分析数据和检验假设。研究结果发现:第一,经销商的网络密度会增大制造商和经销商之间合同治理的强度,使双方签订的合同更加详尽;第二,合同越详尽,双方的渠道冲突越小;第三,经销商的网络中心性会减弱经销商网络密度对合同治理强度(合同详尽性)的正向影响。此外,通过事后检验发现,合同治理强度在经销商网络密度与渠道冲突之间起到负向中介作用,而且这种负向中介作用会因网络中心性的调节而变弱。
Academic research on contract governance mainly involves the dyadic level, that is, the dual relationship composed of two partners is discussed as an analysis unit, while the influence of the characteristics of channel network structure is not considered. The marketing channels take the form of networking, and the dealers’ "banding together" is a typical manifestation. Therefore, it is almost impossible that the behavior of subjects embedded in the network is not affected by network factors. Based on social network theory and the literature of marketing channels, this paper examines the impact of distributors’ "banding together"(Represented by network intensity) on inter-firm contract governance and conflict in marketing channels, and tests the moderating effect of a distributor’s network centrality. Taking the cooperative relationship between manufacturers and distributors as the research setting and collecting the data from the side of manufacturers, this paper analyzes the data of 288 sample units and tests the hypotheses by running multiple regression analysis. The results show that, first, network intensity of grouped distributors positively affects the contract completeness between manufacturers and distributors; second, the contract completeness in turn declines the level of channel conflict; and third, the contract completeness plays a mediating role between network density and channel conflict. In addition, an ex-post analysis finds that the contract completeness plays a negative mediating role between distributors’ network density and channel conflict, and this negative mediating effect would be weakened by the moderating effect of a distributor’s network centrality. In response to previous research, this article explores the impact of characteristics of channel network structure on contract governance from a network perspective, and once again illustrates the necessity and importance of studying channel behavior from the perspective of network structure, and enriches the academic research on channel governance; In addition, this paper will reveal the impacts of dealers’ "banding together" on contract governance strategies, and provide basis for channel partners to adjust contract governance intensity and even change channel governance forms.

Research Area(s)

  • 社会网络理论, 网络密度, 网络中心性, 合同治理, 渠道冲突, Social Network Theory, Network Intensity, Network Centrality, Contract Governance, Channel Conflict

Citation Format(s)

经销商 “抱团” 如何改变渠道中的合同治理. / 丰超; 庄贵军; 陈慧; 卢亭宇.

In: 南开管理评论, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1, 08.04.2019, p. 4-13, 22.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal