非对称供应成本信息下装配系统定价与供货策略研究

In an assembly system consisting of a manufacturer and two complementary suppliers, with random demand, the manufacturer adopts vendor managed inventory to transfer inventory risk and decide the wholesale price of components, the two suppliers have to decide their production before the market demand comes and undertake corresponding inventory risk. In this paper, based on the assumption that there are high cost type and low cost type for each supplier, we use Steinberg game and Nash equilibrium to study the production and pricing strategies under two conditions of asymmetry supplier production cost information and symmetry supplier production cost information, and analyse the value of supplier cost information sharing. The research results indicate that, supplier of high cost obtains more profits when information is symmetric and is willing to join the cost information sharing system, whereas supplier of low cost obtains more profits when information is asymmetric and will not join the cost information sharing system voluntarily. It is also beneficial for the manufacturer and supply chain when supplier production cost information is shared.