股票与债务市场的跨市场联动: 中小股东私人实施机制对企业债务融资的影响

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized the need to “strengthen and improve modern financial regulation.” Enhancing private enforcement mechanisms for minority shareholders is integral to modern financial regulation and crucial for safeguarding minority shareholders' rights. This study, from the perspective of the debt market, investigates the spillover effects of private enforcement mechanisms on debt financing behavior.From the theoretical perspective, private enforcement mechanisms influence debt financing through the following channels. Firstly, private enforcement mechanisms result in economic compensation and related costs that elevate financial strain on firms, diminishing their ability to finance. Then, creditors, including banks, need to accurately assess the debt default risk, thereby affecting loan terms. Secondly, through the social reputation mechanism, private enforcement mechanisms generate negative signals to stakeholders, tarnishing the firm's reputation and eroding creditors' trust. To mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard risks, creditors adjust the costs of debt financing.The research employs a manually collected sample of minority shareholder litigation data spanning from 2006 to 2021. The PSM-DID model is used to examine the impact of private enforcement mechanisms from the creditors' perspective. The findings reveal that private enforcement mechanisms significantly increase corporate debt financing costs. Additionally, the influence of private enforcement mechanisms on corporate debt financing becomes more pronounced after the implementation of the revised Securities Law, indicating heightened market sensitivity to information related to private enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, this paper identifies variations in the impact of private enforcement mechanisms on corporate financing based on factors such as internal control quality, information asymmetry levels, creditor's bargaining power, regional legal environment, and judicial quality. Specifically, private enforcement mechanisms reduce the size of new debt financing and have a more pronounced impact on long-term borrowing.The marginal contribution of this paper to existing literature is as follow. Firstly, this paper provides empirical evidence of the spillover effects of private enforcement mechanisms within China's institutional framework, addressing the scarcity of data arising from the delayed development of China's capital market legal system. Secondly, this paper advances the understanding of the interaction between stock and debt markets by focusing on private enforcement mechanisms. Lastly, this paper provides practical guidance for policy makers on how to balance investor protection and promote high-quality corporate development in an era of intensified regulation. This involves safeguarding the rights of minority shareholders within China's distinctive securities judicial system while mitigating the financial risks associated with excessive shareholder litigation, thereby reducing impediments to corporate high-quality development.