投服中心行权的威慑效应研究: 基于分析师预测的视角

Elucidating the formation and transmission mechanisms of the deterrent effect arising from the China Securities Investor Services Center(ISC)'s exercise of shareholder rights bears significant implications for improving the quality and efficacy of minority investor protection.Based on manually collected data on ISC's shareholder rights exercise events,this paper examines the deterrent effect of ISC's shareholder rights exercise from the perspective of analyst forecasts.The study finds that ISC's shareholder rights exercise improves the analyst forecast accuracy for other nontargeted companies in the same industry and region.On one hand,driven by reputational and competitive pressures,nontargeted companies proactively improve their information disclosure quality,providing a better information foundation for analyst forecasts.On the other hand,increased investor demand for information about companies enhances analyst attention to such companies,promoting inter-analyst competition and information spillovers.Further analysis reveals that the deterrent effect of ISC's shareholder rights exercise is more pronounced in samples where the targeted company has higher industry status,market reactions to the rights exercise events are more negative,and the issues addressed by the rights exercise involve information disclosure.Additionally,ISC's shareholder rights exercise also reduces analyst forecast optimistic bias and forecast dispersion for companies in the same industry and region.This paper provides insights for strengthening the functional role of the China Securities Investor Services Center and improving the information environment of capital markets.