我国反垄断私人诉讼激励制度的建构 - 基于 636 起案件的实证分析

Private anti-monopoly litigations, as an effective way to safeguard the rights and interests of private entities, can make up for the deficiencies of public enforcement, provide remedies for victims, and deter monopolistic conduct. However, through an empirical analysis of 636 civil litigation cases initiated by victims since the implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law, it is found that private antitrust enforcement in China faces challenges such as a low case count, limited case types, low success rate, low net gains for plaintiffs, and lack of standardization in group litigation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and address these issues from a law and economics perspective. By adopting an opt-out collective litigation regime, introducing discretionary punitive damages, and further reducing the burden of proof on plaintiffs, China’s path for incentivizing private antitrust enforcement would be reshaped. As such, plaintiffs’ expected costs would reduce, while their expected benefits and chance of success would rise.