多个大股东与企业短贷长投

Under the “debt-investment” growth model, Chinese enterprises have seen a continuous rise in their debt levels, leading to a prevalent issue of utilizing short-term debt to fund long-term investments. This practice, known as “short funding for long investment” (SFLI), has emerged as a key catalyst for systemic financial risks. Some studies have suggested that revisions and enhancements to macroeconomic policies and financial frameworks could mitigate the SFLI issue. However, despite the passage of time and market evolution, the problem persists. As a result, there′s a pressing need to investigate effective solutions to the SFLI issue from the perspective of micro-level corporate governance.
From the perspective of capital supply and investment demand, based on the relevant theories of corporate governance, this study selects Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as the research sample, uses the stata software and multiple regression analysis method of the fixed effect model to empirically test the impact of multiple major shareholders on SFLI, and discuss the intermediary role of financing constraints and the validity of executive compensation contract in this process. Among them, financing constraints restrict the capital supplies, and management compensation incentives affect the financial and investment strategies. In addition, this study pays attention to the differences and economic consequences of multiple major shareholders in alleviating the SFLI among different types of enterprises.
The results show that the shareholding of multiple major shareholders significantly reduces the level of SFLI. Mechanism test confirmed that multiple major shareholders alleviate the problem of financing constraints through governance and optimize long-term investment demand by increasing executive pay-performance sensitivity, ultimately inhibiting SFLI. Further research found that this equity structure helps the company obtain equity funds through issuing additional shares, but the scale of long-term debt funds has not increased significantly. In addition, the alleviating effect of multiple major shareholders on SFLI is also more significant among companies with a non-state-owned controller, larger management shareholding, and fewer institutional investors. Meanwhile, the robustness test excludes the potential explanation of risk-taking, and the results remain valid after several tests, including using propensity matching score regression, the difference in difference design, alternative variables, and HECKMAN′s two-stage method. The tests of economic consequences discover that the influence of multiple major shareholders on reducing the SFLI can improve enterprise value and reduce the risk of bankruptcy and stock price crashes.
The results highlight the important influence of corporate governance structure on investment and financing decisions, further enriching the research on the influencing factors of SFLI, together with the economic consequences of the ownership structure of the multiple major shareholdings. And it provides a practical reference for alleviating the problems of SFLI and defusing systemic financial risks.