基于博弈论的可再生能源证书交易双层优化模型

Emissions trading schemes (ETS), as a policy tool, are widely used to control and reduce carbon emissions under the market mechanism in many countries. At the same time, renewable energy certificates (REC) are also regarded as an important mechanism to promote the development of renewable energy in the world. However, how to improve the purchase motivation of REC to achieve its design goal is a problem concerned by the government and researchers. In order to explore whether the combination of two mechanisms can improve the purchase motivation of REC to realize further emission reduction, a bi-level model of the trading of REC based on game theory is proposed in this paper. Under the oligopoly electricity market, thermal generators can purchase REC and convert them into carbon emission quotas, while renewable energy power plants and emerging power-to-gas (P2G) stations can cooperate to further increase the profit. Taking the actual REC, electricity, and natural gas markets in Australia as the background, the above model is verified on the IEEE 30 bus system. The simulation results reveal that the REC trading between thermal generators and renewable energy power plants can increase the total social welfare and reduce carbon emissions, and the cooperation between renewable energy power plants and P2G stations is proved to be cohesive. In addition, the influence of carbon price on REC price and emission reduction effect is discussed through sensitivity analysis. © 2021, Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization. All rights reserved.