双重股权代理冲突下的股权激励研究 - 基于关系型契约的视角

Based on the theoretical analysis of dual-class equity agency conflicts,this study employs the Difference-in-Differences(DID) method to empirically examine changes in related-party transactions before and after the equity incentive implementation in listed firms. The findings reveal that firms experience a significant increase in related-party transactions post-equity incentive implementation, primarily driven by abnormal related-party transactions and non-market-priced related-party transactions, which consequently leads to decreased persistence of such transactions. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the increase in related-party transactions is particularly pronounced in state-owned enterprises, those adopting stock option incentives, and firms with superior historical performance, indicating that relational contracts, incentive mechanisms, and appropriable rents significantly influence controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviors. The results demonstrate that while equity incentives serve to mitigate principal-agent conflicts between management and shareholders, thereby reducing Type I agency costs, they may concurrently induce or intensify controlling shareholders’ expropriation of minority interests, leading to an increase in Type II agency costs.