压力型体制下绩效差距何以促进政府绩效提升 —— 北京市 “接诉即办” 的实证研究

       A "pressure system" is a vivid description of the current situation of Chinese government at all levels. However, the existing literature does not clarify the mechanisms behind the pressure system, that is, how the pressure can be transformed into motivation through appropriate incentive mechanisms to promote local governments to improve their performance. In this article, we take the case of Beijing’s "public complaints have been processed without delay "to develop theoretical hypotheses from the perspective of the performance gap.
       The performance gap originated from performance feedback theory, which argues that the main factor affecting management decision-making is not the absolute performance level but rather the performance gap relative to expectations. An organization can generate a historical performance gap based on a comparison with itself or a social performance gap based on a comparison with its competitors. To a certain extent, the performance gap can reflect the degree of accountability pressures. Therefore, we take the performance gap as an indicator to explore how it promotes the level of government performance under different pressures.
       Based on the theory of a pressure system, the settlement of the performance gap indicators and the practical reality of "public complaints have been processed without delay, "we construct an analytical framework of the performance gap in district-level governments, which originates from the perspectives of superior pressures, peer pressures, and public pressures, and we put forward four groups of hypotheses.
       We use monthly panel data of 16 districts in 2019 to explore the mechanism behind the performance gap on performance improvement. The results show that positive and negative social performance gaps are significantly and positively correlated with government performance. Top-down political pressures will not directly motivate the district government to pay attention to the rise or decline of its performance level, but they will have an effect on the district government through peer competition pressures, leading it to pay attention to the performance of other district-level governments in the same area and then to improve its performance level through positive and negative incentives.
       Second, a negative social performance gap has a longer-term impact. This is because a negative performance gap motivates the district-level government to carry out more drastic and in-depth systemic reforms, which result in the impact being more far-reaching. Third, public pressures negatively moderate the relationship between a positive social performance gap and the performance level. The greater the public pressures the smaller the positive effect of a positive social performance gap on the performance level. Fourth the results reveal the mechanisms by which a performance gap affects improvements in performance at the district level, which is significantly different from that at the township level. District leaders are more inclined to choose "no mistakes" than to "show off," forming a dialogue with the theory of "asking for credit and avoiding responsibility."
       The results provide an empirical basis for clarifying the mechanism behind the performance gap and provide empirical evidence for an understanding of the behavioral logic of governments at different levels. We believe future research should analyze data from other regions and in different policy areas. At the same time, the mechanism behind the performance gap affecting the performance level requires further exploration through qualitative research methods such as in-depth interviews and participatory observations.