Project Details
Description
An increasing focus on firms’ political connection has been documented in corporate
strategy literature. Firms get explicitly connected by hiring politicians as their board
directors, or by making firm directors serve as politicians. Firms can also get implicitly
connected by making political contributions. These connections have been established by
firms’ active efforts to be connected for the purpose of enhancing firms’ benefits from
connections.The recent literature documents the importance of geography on firm value. Kim,
Pantzalis, and Park (2011) analyze a political dimension to geography and its impact on
firm value. Firms whose headquarters are located in states more closely aligned with the
party in the White House perform better than those firms located in states which are
less closely aligned with the president’s party. This result can be interpreted as being
consistent with the notion that firms with high alignment with the president’s party
leads to higher policy risk (i.e., uncertainty related to the impacts of changes in
government future policy and its implementation) which, in turn, results in higher
future returns. Alternatively, their findings can also be interpreted that benefits from
connections to the party in the White House causes an increase in cash flows and higher
future returns.The main purpose of this proposal is to differentiate these two competing forces of policy
risk and indirect political benefits in the context of firm’s access to private debt
financing. This attempt is possible under debt financing but it is extremely difficult by
studying cross-sectional variations in future returns of firms, because both explanations
predict that firms with high political alignment outperform those with low alignment.
Firms with high alignment is more susceptible to higher loan interest premium and
more restrictive loan contracts, given the fact that policy risk could be translated into
the downside risk of the bank loan. Benefit from indirect connections to the party in
White House will induce a lower interest and fewer restrictive loan contracts, as opposed
to the policy risk prediction.Given the scarce of the literature on the above-mentioned issue, our research will
introduce political geography to loan literature and identify the possible link between
them. Our research will also broaden the definition of political connectedness to include
small-sized firms. Those direct political connections through human ties and
contributions can be utilized by big-sized firms with more resources. However, geopolitics
can be applied to all firms in a specific state.
| Project number | 9041821 |
|---|---|
| Grant type | GRF |
| Status | Finished |
| Effective start/end date | 1/07/12 → 5/03/14 |
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