Is Bureaucratic Autonomy a Double-Edged Sword? Examining its Relationships with Organizational Corruption and Performance

New Public Management reforms in recent decades have been based on the assumption that delegating autonomy to government agencies brings about improvements in organizational performance. This presents an ‘accountability dilemma’ problem, which indicates a trade-off between performance and accountability. That is, when government is more inclined to improve organizational performance with increased autonomy, bureaucrats’ accountability can be compromised resulting in the increased likelihood of bureaucratic corruption.Based on this ‘accountability dilemma’ problem, this project will examine how bureaucratic autonomy, which refers to the exemption of constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies, influences performance as well as corruption of administrative agencies. Research findings to data are equivocal, based on case studies or survey data, and thus we attempt to conduct the first large-sample statistical analyses with systematic data sets over time. In this study, bureaucratic autonomy will be divided into three dimensions: legal autonomy refers to the extent to which the legal status of the agency prevents the government from altering decision-making competencies; structural autonomy is defined as the extent to which the agency is shielded from influence by the government through lines of hierarchy; and financial autonomy refers to the extent to which the agency does not depend on governmental funding.To achieve the goals, we will develop unique data sets that measure organizational autonomy, performance, corruption, and relevant variables (e.g., organizational and managerial attributes) from multiple time points. With time-series data, we will conduct statistical analyses to test the causal relationships of autonomy with performance and corruption. Furthermore, our data will be helpful in extending our current models by enabling future research to investigate what conditions (e.g., organizational structure and management strategies) enhance or weaken the causal relationships.The South Korean central government is an ideal location for this project, as it provides uniquely and systematically externally-audited, archival, and survey data of autonomy, performance, corruption, and other relevant variables. Such data are not available elsewhere. The Korean government has collected these data annually since 2006. Moreover, this research will be conducted by scholars whose research specialties include organizational performance (Jung, Rainey), organizational autonomy (Oh, Rainey), and appropriate methodological skills (Jung, Rainey, Oh).The research outcome will contribute to the theory development of bureaucratic autonomy, corruption, and performance by investigating the causal relationships. Furthermore, the findings are expected to help policy-makers, public employees, and scholars in many countries promote wide-ranging debates on designing and implementing administrative reforms.