ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5679-7237
Scopus Author ID: 8261549100

Metrics for Academic and Research Impact

PhD - Finance
PhD - Physics
MS - Physics
BS - Physics              

Dr. James Wang received a Bachelor's degree from the University of Science and Technology of China and a Master's degree from the New York University, both in Physics. He did his PhD thesis on U.S. Treasury auctions at the University of Utah. Before joining the City University of Hong Kong, Dr. Wang previously worked at the Fuqua School of Business in Duke University, the Thunderbird School of Global Management, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research agenda includes topics from corporate finance, market microstructure, and applications of auction theory. His publications appeared in Economic Theory, Journal of Business, Journal of Financial Economics, and Journal of Financial Markets. Dr. Wang's research on the U.S. Treasury securities market is notable among the academic and policy circles.

Participating in or organising a conference / an event

Presented Conference Papers

• J Wang (2006), "A Theory of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets", presented at the 2006 American Finance Association Meetings, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
• J Wang (2005), "A Theory of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets", presented at the 2005 China International Conference in Finance, Kunming, China.
• J Wang (2004), "CEO Selection and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard", presented at the 2004 China International Conference in Finance, Shanghai, China.
• J Wang (2004), "Optimal Bidding in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions", presented at the 2004 Econometric Society Meetings, San Diego, California, U.S.A.
• J Wang (2003), "Optimal Bidding in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions", presented at the 2003 Annual Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, Australia.
• J Wang (2001), "Market Architecture: Limit-Order Books versus Dealership Markets", presented at the 2001 Econometric Society Meeting, New York City, New York, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1999), "Market Architecture: Limit-Order Books versus Dealership Markets", presented at the 1999 European Finance Association Meeting, Fontainebleu, France.
• J Wang (1999), "Why Is Inter-Dealer Trading So Prevalent?", presented at the Western Finance Association Meetings, Santa Monica, California, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1998), "Market Architecture: Limit-Order Books versus Dealership Markets", presented at the May 1998 NBER Conference on Market Microstructure, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1997), "Auctioning with When-Issued Trading: A Model of the U.S. Treasury Markets", presented at the 1997 North American Summer Meeting of Econometric Society, Pasadena, California, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1997), "Auctioning with When-Issued Trading: A Model of the U.S. Treasury Markets", presented at the 1997 American Finance Association Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1996), "Auctions with When-Issued Trading: A Model of the U.S. Treasury Markets", presented at the 1996 Western Finance Association Meetings, Sunriver, Oregon, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1996), "Stock-Based Compensation as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism: The Monitoring Role of the Market", presented at the 1996 Western Finance Association Meetings, Sunriver, Oregon, U.S.A.
• J Wang (1995), "Auctioning Divisible Goods", presented at the Symposium on Fixed-Income Securities at the 1995 Western Finance Association Meetings, Aspen, Colorado, U.S.A.

• Corporate Finance
• Market Microstructure
• Auctions

Working Papers

• S. Viswanathan and James J. D. Wang "Auctions with When-issued Trading: A Model of the U.S. Treasury Markets", submitted to the Review of Financial Studies.
• S. Viswanathan, James J. D. Wang and Thomas P. Witelski "Optimal Bidding in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions", submitted to the International Economic Review.
• Jiang Luo and James J. D. Wang "CEO Selection and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Harzard".
• S. Viswanathan and James J. D. Wang "Divisible Good Auctions with Noisy Supply: A Revenue Comparison of Vickrey, Uniform-Price, and Discriminatory Auction Formats".